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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM

result in revocation of parole and of the permission to start the new (second)
sentence at that time. The prisoner was paroled under the second sentence in
1946 while still on parole from the first sentence and in 1947 was arrested and
convicted of a misdemeanor, 17 thereby breaking his parole. 18 In 1948, he again
started to serve his sentences.
Pursuant to section 218 of the Correction Law, the Parole Board ordered
that the balance of the maximum sentences be served--consecutively, not concurrently. When the longer of the two remaining periods had been served, this habeas
corpus action was begun on the theory that the Parole Board had no power once
the sentences had been started concurrently to suspend one until the other had
been served.
But in this case the Court of Appeals held (4-3): "By the provisions of
section 218 of that law [Correction Law] the board was empowered to require
the prisoner 'to serve out in prison the balance of the maximum term for which
he was originally sentenced.' Nothing more than that was done here." The Court
felt that the Rainone case concerned a different question and that the decision did
not bind them to restrict the power of the Parole Board in a case such as this.
However, the dissent felt that the reasoning of the Rainone case compelled
the Court to take a consistent view on the facts of the instant case. The construction of the statutes leading to the divisions of authority outlined in Rainone and
resulting in the Court's declarations (outlined above), the dissent argued, should
deny any board power to make the remaining sentences consecutive. By making
the sentences consecutive, the board is in effect suspending the running of the
sentence.
The majority seems willing to allow the power of suspension to the board
when the prisoner's own culpable conduct has been the motivating cause as
opposed to voluntary action on the part of the board as in the Rainone case.
Although this may be a reasonable distinction, the result would seem to conflict
with the division of authority and reasoning outlined in Rainone.
Waiver of Jury Trial
Article I, section 2 of the New York State Constitution states in part:
A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases,
except those in which the crime charged may be punishable by death,
17. Incarceration as a misdemeanant suspends the running of sentences.

Spearling v. Moran, 277 App.Div. 778, 97 N.Y.S.2d 380 (2d Dep't 1950); see also
note 14, supra.
18.
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by a written instrument signed by the defendant in person in open
court before and with the approval of a judge or justice of a court
having jurisdiction to try the offense. The legislature may enact laws,
not inconsistent herewith, governing the form, content, manner and
tine of presentation of the instrument effectuating such waiver.
In People v. Carroll,19 the defendant, brought to trial on an indictment
charging him with grand larceny in the second degree, waived jury trial. A written
stipulation signed by defendant and his counsel, citing the constitutional provision
and stating defendant's name, indictment number, the waiver, and a recital of
full knowledge was entered into. The district attorney objected to the waiver on
the ground that no legislative enactment had been made pursuant to the constitutional provision. The case proceeded without a jury, however, over his objection.
To test the court's power to accept the waiver, the charge was re-presented
to the Grand Jury which handed down a second indictment upon the same facts
and for the same crime. Upon arraignment the defendant pleaded not guilty and
moved to dismiss the second indictment on the grounds of former jeopardy.
The motion was granted and was subsequently unanimously affirmed by the
Appellate Division from which decision appeal was taken.
The Court of Appeals, speaking of the rule of construction to be applied
to constitutional provisions, stated: "When this language is dear and leads to no
absurd conclusion there is no occasion, and indeed, it would be improper to
search beyond the instrument for an assumed intent."20 Since the form of the

waiver was indicated for criminal cases and the grant of authority to the legislature
phrased permissively, the section logically would seem self-executing. Further, in
construing constitutional provisions as between being self-executing or merely
general directions for subsequent legislation the rule is now in favor of selfexecuting provisions. 21 Reviewing the history of the amendment the Court
found substantial evidence that the amendment was intended to be self-executing.
Accordingly, the Court found the procedural detail sufficient without supplemental
legislation and thus affirmed the lower courts.
Form of Remedy from Illegal Sentence; Use of Indeferminate Term
Habeas corpus is ordinarily an appropriate remedy, with respect to the
judgment or sentence where and only where the court was without jurisdiction in
19. 3 N.Y.2d 686, 171 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1958).
20. Citing: Latting v. Cordell, 197 Old. 369, 172 P.2d, 397 (1946); State
ex rel. Trent v. Sims, 138 W.Va. 244, 77 S.E.2d 122 (1953); MeKinney, CONST.
RULES OF INTERPRETATION, part 1, p. 5.
21. State ex rel Russell v. Bliss, 156 Ohio St. 147, 101 N.E.2d 289 (1951);
Morgan v. Board of Supervisors, 67 Ariz. 133, 192 P.2d 236 (1948); State ex rel
Noe v. Knop, La.App., 190 So. 135 (1939).

